Separating the Facts from the Myths in PNG’s ICAC Saga

​By Sam Koim, OBE

​Papua New Guinea’s anti-corruption movement has entered a critical juncture, with the ongoing controversy surrounding the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) raising both public concern and political debate. As the Prime Minister and two Deputy Commissioners trade accusations, confusion has emerged over whether the issue is political interference, institutional failure, or a mix of both. Having long been involved in the fight against corruption and the establishment of ICAC’s foundations, I offer this commentary not as a partisan argument, but as a fact-based, historically grounded analysis — a debate between myth and reality.

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1. The Central Question — Political Will or Leadership Failure?At the heart of this debate lies a single question: Is the current ICAC saga a reflection of fading political will, or is it a crisis of leadership within the institution itself? Experience from global anti-corruption models such as Singapore’s CPIB and Hong Kong’s ICAC shows that political will is indispensable. Without it, no anti-corruption body can thrive. Yet, political will alone cannot substitute for competence and delivery. Governments demonstrate commitment not merely by words but by law, funding, and credible appointments. PNG has shown such will — but its translation into results depends on the institution’s operational leadership.

2. Historical Context — From Coordination to ConstitutionPNG’s journey did not start with ICAC. It began modestly with the National Anti-Corruption Coordination Authority (NACA), which lacked legal authority and funding. Its successor, Task Force Sweep (TFS), was empowered by government mandate, equipped with resources, and delivered results swiftly — securing convictions, recovering funds, and proving that corruption can be confronted with determination and mandate. However, TFS’s abrupt dismantling in 2014 revealed a harsh truth: without constitutional protection, anti-corruption efforts are vulnerable to political tides. ICAC was designed precisely to overcome this fragility.

3. The Birth of ICAC — A Politically Backed InstitutionIn 2014, under Peter O’Neill’s government, Parliament amended the Constitution to create ICAC as a permanent body. The enabling law came in 2020 under James Marape’s government, representing bipartisan continuity rarely seen in PNG politics. The Appointment Committee — comprising the Prime Minister, Opposition Leader, Chief Justice, and others — was intentionally bipartisan. Three commissioners, all expatriates, were sworn in mid-2023, supported by an initial funding package of about K60 million. This was coupled with the Whistleblower Protection Act and other complementary reforms. By all structural indicators, ICAC began its life with unprecedented legal strength and political support.

4. The Independence Debate — Political Interference or Institutional Inertia?Critics argue that the government has interfered with ICAC’s independence. Yet, evidence for this claim remains elusive. The law prohibits direct executive involvement in ICAC operations, staffing, or investigations. Unless proof emerges, narratives of “political control” remain speculative. The greater issue appears to be inertia — two years after establishment, ICAC has not produced visible operational results. Task Force Sweep, by comparison, began investigations within weeks. If ICAC’s leadership has the mandate, funding, and independence it claims, the absence of results cannot be blamed solely on politics. Institutional autonomy brings with it institutional accountability.

5. Internal Breakdown — The Leadership CrisisThe current conflict between the Commissioner and two Deputy Commissioners exposes a deeper malaise. Public airing of grievances among senior officials has undermined confidence in an institution meant to embody integrity. Leadership divisions have frozen operations and distracted from the Commission’s mandate. In any organisation, such dysfunction reflects a breakdown of governance. The Appointment Committee’s intervention, including suspensions, while controversial, may have been unavoidable. Still, fairness demands due process — a tribunal must be convened promptly to hear the suspended officers’ cases and prevent ICAC from drifting further into disrepute.

6. Accountability — Where Responsibility Ultimately LiesHere lies the crux of the debate. When an institution is provided with constitutional backing, adequate resources, and freedom from interference, its success or failure rests with its leadership. Political leaders enable; institutional heads execute. Drawing from personal experience leading Task Force Sweep and the Internal Revenue Commission (IRC), I can affirm that while political will sets direction, operational performance depends entirely on the institution’s head. Once authority and funding are secured, the burden of delivery shifts. If ICAC has failed to deliver, its leadership must bear responsibility, not merely the government that created it.

7. The Path Forward — Restoring Confidence and ResultsPNG’s anti-corruption evolution — from NACA to Task Force Sweep to ICAC — represents decades of progress. The current impasse should not erase that achievement. It must instead prompt reflection on how to realign leadership, reassert purpose, and restore credibility. The fight against corruption is not owned by one administration or one leader. It is a national enterprise. The next phase must focus on results: investigations, prosecutions, and deterrence. The tribunal for the suspended commissioners must proceed swiftly, ensuring justice and stability.

Ultimately, the debate over ICAC’s performance is not about whether the government supports anti-corruption — it clearly has. The issue now is whether those entrusted with independence can translate authority into action. Political will built the institution; leadership must now make it work.